Containing and transporting volatile, flammable, and explosive material poses serious risk when the containers are exposed to detonation, overpressure, penetration, or impact. This is particularly true when the material and associated containers are integrated into systems that have higher occurrences of such events. For example, when storage containers are transported or used as a fuel source in vehicles, the containers are subject to damage from collisions or penetration during accidents. Once the material is exposed, the health and safety of the occupants and response team may be at substantial risk.
The transportation, storage and handling of hazardous pressure containers used to contain or accommodate flammable, combustible, compressed and/or volatile fluids may be exposed to collision, incidents, degradation or deterioration that could cause premature and unwanted failure of a pressure container's wall(s), potentially in a surreptitious, rapid, subtle or insidious way, which may expose life to harm with significant possibility of major loss of life or economic damage(s). These types of incidents may occur during normal operating environments that are common in the transportation industry.
The Gas Research Institute (GRI), after several catastrophic explosions with compress natural gas (CNG) cylinders, desired to understand the automotive threat environments. In 1994, the GRI contracted Battelle to identify “service environments for automotive. Battelle listed Four (4) recommendations for industry. To date, no auto or cylinder manufacturer in the world has complied with Battelle's recommendations.                The objective of the industry survey was to define the mechanical and chemical environments encountered by NGV fuel cylinders in particular and for underbody component materials (especially composites) in general. The mechanical environments included long-term loadings due to fatigue and installation method, as well as short-lean loading such as impact damage from stones or baffle accidents. The potential chemical environments included fluids and chemicals both internal and external to the vehicles.1         
Today, millions of compressed natural gas vehicles are in countries like Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, India and the Asia-Pacific region. Experience in these regions has shown that premature pressure container failures and explosions of CNG cylinders (rated for 3600 psig) are on the rise due to faulty and aging pressure containers. In 2009, China banned all Type IV CNG cylinders after numerous intolerable tragic accidents. In 2013, Pakistan reported over 2000 and 3000 CNG incident related deaths in the last two consecutive years, respectively. In 2014, auto and pressure container manufacturers continued to manufacture and produce products that have risky lethal consequences that are based on unproven technologies claimed to be “good enough.” Very soon high pressure and/or highly flammable compressed fuel containers for automobiles (at 3600 to 10,000 psig and higher) may be rolling out onto public highways near all of us around the world.
At present, the use of scientifically unproven, aging and vulnerable lightweight hazardous pressure containers may prevail in the public transportation sector as countries scramble and struggle to quickly economize on fuel consumption. In 2014, EPA posted a warning; “because hydrogen exhibits some special properties such as high flammability and explosivity, the possibility of explosion may increase due to its storage tank failure.”1 
There may be a heighted risk of pressure container failure (poorly constructed or not) at a fueling station and during filling i.e. pressurization of compressed hydrogen or natural gas, or shortly after filling. Alternately, failure may be caused by catastrophic events including but not limited to collisions, accidents, impacts or other catastrophic incidents. In certain embodiments described herein, the risk of a catastrophic pressure container failure or explosion (despite the condition, quality or incident) is eliminated for most synergistic service environments involving an automobile.
One of the design philosophies presented herein provides for a device assemblage that renders a containment device fail-safe.